The Rest of College Football

[Rob F]

Fully agree.

Even my daughter (a Texas fan, I have no idea why) agreed that ISU should have had that call. But like you said, when Texas needs a call, Texas gets a call. Shame on those Big12 refs.

[hack]

Don't blame yourself, Rob. You teach them to walk, and then you teach them to walk away, and that's all you can do. They have to pick their own direction in which to walk.

[Hannibal]

Last night was also an example of ISU getting burned by outdated 1970s thinking. Up 3 points with 4th and short from inside Texas's 10 yard line, they elect to kick a field goal instead of go for the TD, which would have ended the game. Then, they go into "bend but don't break" mode, letting Texas eat up a bunch of clock so that they effectively get the last real posession. Classic dinosaur heuristics at work, instead of the coach making decisions that are most likely to win the game. I can't really say much bad about Paul Rhoads, since at least 80% of the coaches in the country fall victim to this, but it's interesting how coaches are so poor at assessing risks and rewards. Like Lloyd's infuriating punt against the Buckeyes in 2005 or Kirk Frerentz's weekly punt on 4th and 1 from the opponent's 40 yard line.

[iam416]

Yeah, it's like risk is the only part of the equation.

UFM is super aggressive on 4th down. Makes for a lot more tense plays, but somewhere around midfield, 4th and 1 isn't even a decision. Unless they go into a shell and inexplicably play Tresselball ala the 4th against Wisky.

Lloyd's punt in 2005 really stands out. I think my feeling of relief would have been greater, but I knew he was going to play for the extra 15-20 yards of field position instead of trying to win the game then and there.

[iam416]

Another example that is more rare, but if you just scored, are still down a score, have all your timeouts left -- anything under 3 minutes. ONSIDE KICK.

The game is over if they get a first down. By kicking off, you're giving yourself 1 chance to regain possession instead of 2. But a ton of coaches will kick.

[Hannibal]

It's conventional wisdom that was formed back when games ended 12-10 and quarterbacks threw only 9 passes per game, completing 5 of them. For a couple of decades at least, fans have been booing when their coaches send the punt team out onto the field on 4th and 1 at midfield. Usually when that happens, the color commentator makes some condescending comment about how the coach knows best and the fans may want aggressive playcalling but they don't know what's good for them. IMHO what's really happening is that the fans know in their hearts that it's easy even for a team with a relatively shitty running game to pick up 4th and 1, and that the 30 yards of field position that you gain with a pooch punt isn't much of a benefit in an era where games don't end 12-10 (except in rare cases).

I remember when Hal Mumme was the coach at Kentucky and he had a reputation of being a nutty gambler who always went for it on 4th down. What was really happening was that he knew that his QB had probaby a 75% chance of completing a 2 yard pass and that his defense couldn't stop the other team.

[Hannibal]

Another example that is more rare, but if you just scored, are still down a score, have all your timeouts left -- anything under 3 minutes. ONSIDE KICK.

The game is over if they get a first down. By kicking off, you're giving yourself 1 chance to regain possession instead of 2. But a ton of coaches will kick.

And then there's the being down by 15 late in the game, scoring a touchdown, and kicking the XP. That means that the entire game rests on you getting the 2 on the next TD, with no time left to adjust your strategy if you miss it.

[Jeff Buchanan]

Can either of you boys give an explanation of why, then, we pay these CEOs millions to make dumb-ass decisions like these when the reward for success is so much greater than the downside risks?

Boggles my mind.

My mind tells me that CFB coaches, in general, are influenced by their past histories and these are rife with the heuristics of unrecognized sub-optimal outcomes. It seems to me, that some bright fellow is going to come along that embraces decision making based on mathematically sound risk/reward probability calculations and advantage his football team by just doing that.

It would seem that with the power of computer you could evaluate the risk reward of millions of situations and come up with the optimal decision. I've seen some of this done by certain members of the mgoblog staff on a small scale and its impressive when they can demonstrate how a decision based on, what appears to be, just a gut feeling of a coach can be so catastrophic to a game outcome.

[Hannibal]

It seems to me, that some bright fellow is going to come along that embraces decision making based on mathematically sound risk/reward probability calculations and advantage his football team by just doing that.

It has already happened somewhat. Bobby Bowden, Urban Meyer, Hal Mumme, Mike Leach are but a few examples. Even maybe Brady Hoke, who has made some great aggressive playcalls while at Michigan and definitely errs on the side of aggression I think that the wisdom is gradually spreading as the stigma of failing to pick up a 4th down decreases and the stigma of punting increases.

[Hannibal]

There might also be a psychology at work that lots of guys who are willing to make these playcalls happen to not be very fundamentally sound coaches. There might be something about the old-fashioned dinosaur brain that makes coaches better drill instructors and motivators. More old-fashioned also means more focused on technique and fundamentals and less tolerant of mistakes. So while RichRod made better in-game decisions than Lloyd, his defense was so terrible that it didn't matter.

[Wild Hoss]

I don't have a problem with the decision. It wasn't really 4th and short, it was 4th and 3. If ISU goes for it and fails Texas is pinned deep, but has three minutes and 3 TOs to drive into FG range.

You don't really lose that much yardage in kicking off; the 25 vs the 11 in this instance, but with the FG you force TX to drive for a TD.

They did, but not after seeing a pass sail through the hands of two ISU defenders, and getting a major gift on that fumble no-call. Truth be told, Rhoades' decision DID work, but a failure to make a play by his defense and a bad call by the officials lost him the game anyway.

[Hannibal]

Eh. It wasn't the worst ever decision, but I still didnt like it. Tejas had all three timeouts and Iowa State's corners were laughably overmatched, and the fact that Texas had all 4 downs available to them made it more likely that they would score. I didn't have much confidence in their defense to hold the Longhorns out of the end zone. Texas never passed up on a field goal on 4th down because they needed a TD, so the extra 3 points didn't figure into the strategy at all. If ISU goes for it and fails, then Texas at least needs one more first down before punching it into the end zone.

[Wild Hoss]

Where ISU blew it IMO was their playcalling inside the 10. TX was all over that initial IZ handoff as it was utterly predictable and the Clones had little success running inside all night anyway. Next play ought to have been a playfake off IZ action, lob over the top to the TE or slant to No. 9, but they got stuffed again instead.

[iam416]

It was not the correct decision. Not egregious, but meh.

So, what's he gain from it? The delta in likelihood that UT gets to the 25 and makes a FG versus scores a TD with all 4 downs (as correctly noted by Hanni). I think that delta is relatively small. Even when it's 3 downs, red zone scoring favors TDs by a significant margin supporting that conclusion that a team that reaches the 20 is more likely to score a TD than a FG. With 4 downs, it goes up even further. I think it's fair to assume that a team that gets to the 25 in UT's situation is 80% likely to score a TD. So, you gain a 20% advantage.

The question, then, is what is the likelihood of converting the 4th and 3 and winning the game? IMO, it's no less than 40%.

If the foregoing assumptions are true or conservative, then the decision was a poor decision.

[Wild Hoss]

What he gained from it was a win, save the ineptitude of Big 12 officiating.