There have been conflicting reports on the impact of sanctions on the Russian war fighting economy and how Russian consumers are being affected. A report I read this weekend focuses on the value of the ruble. It rose at the start of the war, held relatively steady and about a month ago began to drop. Russia trades energy in dollars so the Ruble/$ exchange rate is important. When it declines, energy prices, and everything that is remotely attached to these, goes up in Russia and real war fighting income goes down. Analysts predict the downward trend in the Ruble will continue choking off Russia's ability to pay for its war. Hi tech components are in short supply limiting the resupply of modern weapons that depend on them. Suppliers of all goods - consumer and otherwise - who relied on stock on the shelves have burned through that and no new deliveries to suppliers are expected. This is going to trickle down to consumers and the MOD.
Certain consumers, middle and upper middle class, are beginning to feel the pinch with empty grocery and department store shelves and rising fuel prices. Not likely enough to take to the streets and start calling for the end of Putin's war but the underground complaining, already underway, will increase. Russians, the ones that matter, have access to outside information that counters Putin's so far effective propaganda intended to rally national pride and willingness to sacrifice for the war effort. Its effectiveness relies on a picture of successes on the battlefield. Of course, state broadcast media give viewers plenty of that but it's on line video, some of it pretty graphic, that paints a much different story.
Putin has not blocked Telegram, a prominent on-line messaging service. That is due to the impact that nationalist, pro-war milbloggers have on public perceptions of the war. Not all of it is positive - a lot of it being highly critical of the Russian MOD. But, overall, it is at least balanced with some of it coming from people on the ground where reports are originating. Being balanced, whether the pro-war milbloggers know it or not, the best you can say about the progress of Russian forces on the ground is that it is slow. Putin has made several recent speeches in various forums to stress that this will be a long and difficult special military operation but Russia will prevail. That remains to be seen. The conflict is at a tipping or inflection point per ISW and will "culminate" (this is as far as an operation can go based on combat power and logistics support) for one side or the other in the early part of 2023.
If things go Ukraine's way, the road ahead is going to get harder and harder for Putin. Most dangerous outcome involves three entirely possible events: (1) Ukraine pushes Russian forces back further east from the Kharkiv Oblast border securing defensible positions from which to shell remaining Russian defensive positions back to the Russian border. (2) Ukraine penetrates Russian defensive positions and breaks through with armor and artillery in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (DNR and LNR). (3) Ukraine clears the entirety of a poorly defended Kherson Oblast and approaches Crimea.
These events will likely happen sequentially and if Ukraine succeeds, Putin will be forced to either sue for peace on Ukraine's terms or threaten the use of nuclear weapons citing a threat to Russian territory - all three Oblasts previously held by Ukraine and illegally declared Russian last July. The world will hold its breath.
Certain consumers, middle and upper middle class, are beginning to feel the pinch with empty grocery and department store shelves and rising fuel prices. Not likely enough to take to the streets and start calling for the end of Putin's war but the underground complaining, already underway, will increase. Russians, the ones that matter, have access to outside information that counters Putin's so far effective propaganda intended to rally national pride and willingness to sacrifice for the war effort. Its effectiveness relies on a picture of successes on the battlefield. Of course, state broadcast media give viewers plenty of that but it's on line video, some of it pretty graphic, that paints a much different story.
Putin has not blocked Telegram, a prominent on-line messaging service. That is due to the impact that nationalist, pro-war milbloggers have on public perceptions of the war. Not all of it is positive - a lot of it being highly critical of the Russian MOD. But, overall, it is at least balanced with some of it coming from people on the ground where reports are originating. Being balanced, whether the pro-war milbloggers know it or not, the best you can say about the progress of Russian forces on the ground is that it is slow. Putin has made several recent speeches in various forums to stress that this will be a long and difficult special military operation but Russia will prevail. That remains to be seen. The conflict is at a tipping or inflection point per ISW and will "culminate" (this is as far as an operation can go based on combat power and logistics support) for one side or the other in the early part of 2023.
If things go Ukraine's way, the road ahead is going to get harder and harder for Putin. Most dangerous outcome involves three entirely possible events: (1) Ukraine pushes Russian forces back further east from the Kharkiv Oblast border securing defensible positions from which to shell remaining Russian defensive positions back to the Russian border. (2) Ukraine penetrates Russian defensive positions and breaks through with armor and artillery in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (DNR and LNR). (3) Ukraine clears the entirety of a poorly defended Kherson Oblast and approaches Crimea.
These events will likely happen sequentially and if Ukraine succeeds, Putin will be forced to either sue for peace on Ukraine's terms or threaten the use of nuclear weapons citing a threat to Russian territory - all three Oblasts previously held by Ukraine and illegally declared Russian last July. The world will hold its breath.
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