The level of granular detail available in the daily ISW Critical Threat Reports is impressive. This is especially true in the latest 10/4 edition. There's quite a bit of clarity with respect to Ukrainian successes in the east (Donetsk Oblast) and south (Kherson Oblast). In the Kherson region the level of detail, previusly unavailable, is such that amateur military analysts, like myself, can see the emerging encirclement tactics the Ukrainians are successfully employing to force Russian unit withdrawals for fear of being encircled and forcing a surrender enmasse. It is also clear that whatever the fighting strength of Russian units along the front lines they establish are insufficient in numbers to defend those lines. The Ukrainian forces are breaking through and advancing.
ISW is also reporting detailed insight into the fractures and infighting within three groups, the support of them, essential to Putin's power base. For the first time, ISW is suggesting that Putin's presidency may be threatened by internal domestic forces he is not in control of. Most of these have to deal with the bureaucratic bungling of the MOD's mobilization and resistance to mobilization by large swaths of young Russians. The number seeking deferments or fleeing Russia are in the 100s of thousands. It is also being reported that interna security forces - the FSB and Rosgavardia - are resisting the drawdown of their personnel at the direction of the MOD to fill mobilization quotas.
The immediate effects on mobilization inside Russia to the relief of undermanned and collapsing Russian fighting units is going to be limited. It may reverse Ukrainian gains in the long term - meaning after a winter slow down and into next spring - if domestic dissent and internal infighting within the Kremlin don't render mobilization and training efforts of those mobilized failures. The US is reportedly warning the Zenski government it "must capitalize on recent gains." To me this suggests US intel sources know that if Russia succeeds in outlasting the forces aligned against it and mounts counter offensives in Ukraine that reverse today's Ukrainian gains, the larger battle v. Putin's land grabbing objectives will be lost.
ISW is also reporting detailed insight into the fractures and infighting within three groups, the support of them, essential to Putin's power base. For the first time, ISW is suggesting that Putin's presidency may be threatened by internal domestic forces he is not in control of. Most of these have to deal with the bureaucratic bungling of the MOD's mobilization and resistance to mobilization by large swaths of young Russians. The number seeking deferments or fleeing Russia are in the 100s of thousands. It is also being reported that interna security forces - the FSB and Rosgavardia - are resisting the drawdown of their personnel at the direction of the MOD to fill mobilization quotas.
The immediate effects on mobilization inside Russia to the relief of undermanned and collapsing Russian fighting units is going to be limited. It may reverse Ukrainian gains in the long term - meaning after a winter slow down and into next spring - if domestic dissent and internal infighting within the Kremlin don't render mobilization and training efforts of those mobilized failures. The US is reportedly warning the Zenski government it "must capitalize on recent gains." To me this suggests US intel sources know that if Russia succeeds in outlasting the forces aligned against it and mounts counter offensives in Ukraine that reverse today's Ukrainian gains, the larger battle v. Putin's land grabbing objectives will be lost.
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