Tweet
Jon, IMO maintaining fictions is a part of statecraft, and for various strategic and realist purposes. But US policy now amounts to picking a side, so it is now formally no different an actor than Russia or China or any other foreign country aiming to project power in the region. It's a surrender of a useful power-is-perception tool, and comes with no hard benefits. This will make it harder in the future for US foreign policy to maintain a fiction it that it still wants to maintain, which is that Israel is not on a path toward rogue-state status. It will also make it harder eventually to force a solution upon the Palestinians.
Ultimately, if foreign policy in the region amounts to picking this side or that, you're going to be picking allies that engage in terrorism. We've done that for years in backing Saudi anyways. With Israel at least the track record is inconsistent, and you can defend the choice of ally by citing some very admirable wartime conduct. With Saudi there's no possibility of that, so we maintain the fiction.
If the choice is amongst which terrorists to back, well, I can see why the Israel/Saudi/UAE axis appeals based on the current policy process. It means more chances to sell weapons, and Iran's lobby in DC doesn't have as much cash to throw around. If you want to wonder whether policy be for sale or aligned to long-term interests, well, Saudi is going to run out of money and collapse in on itself in the next few decades. Its policy ambitions will shrink from competing with Iran to trying to control the 20m Wahhabis in the country but without the money it used to have to throw at that problem. The Sunni/Shia divide only a temporary way to view the various players here. Iran can be the regional hegemon, and a whole bunch of countries nominally Sunni can deal with that. Hopefully Iran undergoes revolution before that. If Iran self-inflicts, or if a revolution is protected, the UAE could emerge as a for-now hegemon. Right now the UAE is in lockstep with Saudi, but Saudi will not be able to afford the price of loyalty for very much longer. It will be the real power in the UAE-Saudi relationship for years before we all know it for sure -- another fiction that will be maintained.
IMO the US has to have an engaged relationship with all of these countries, and stick to policy based on long-term interests rather than policymaker paydays.
Ultimately, if foreign policy in the region amounts to picking this side or that, you're going to be picking allies that engage in terrorism. We've done that for years in backing Saudi anyways. With Israel at least the track record is inconsistent, and you can defend the choice of ally by citing some very admirable wartime conduct. With Saudi there's no possibility of that, so we maintain the fiction.
If the choice is amongst which terrorists to back, well, I can see why the Israel/Saudi/UAE axis appeals based on the current policy process. It means more chances to sell weapons, and Iran's lobby in DC doesn't have as much cash to throw around. If you want to wonder whether policy be for sale or aligned to long-term interests, well, Saudi is going to run out of money and collapse in on itself in the next few decades. Its policy ambitions will shrink from competing with Iran to trying to control the 20m Wahhabis in the country but without the money it used to have to throw at that problem. The Sunni/Shia divide only a temporary way to view the various players here. Iran can be the regional hegemon, and a whole bunch of countries nominally Sunni can deal with that. Hopefully Iran undergoes revolution before that. If Iran self-inflicts, or if a revolution is protected, the UAE could emerge as a for-now hegemon. Right now the UAE is in lockstep with Saudi, but Saudi will not be able to afford the price of loyalty for very much longer. It will be the real power in the UAE-Saudi relationship for years before we all know it for sure -- another fiction that will be maintained.
IMO the US has to have an engaged relationship with all of these countries, and stick to policy based on long-term interests rather than policymaker paydays.
Comment