Miscellaneous And Off Topic Subjects

[iam416]

Also, DSL’s slander of Grant is shameful. That a northerner would STILL be hoodwinked by the insipid Dunning School is an embarrassment to all northerners.

[Dr. Strangelove]

Also, DSL’s slander of Grant is shameful. That a northerner would STILL be hoodwinked by the insipid Dunning School is an embarrassment to all northerners.

Heh heh.

Although it was my Chester A. Arthur joke I was most proud of.

[Da Geezer]

Nebraska Unemployment Rate is so low...even you worthless progs here could find work...

No, they wouldn't. Very few progs have jobs, at least not private-sector jobs They'd rather draw welfare, or government pay.

And DSL: The Trump tax cuts set off a cascade of positive developments for the economy. I understand today's talking point for the Ds is that Trump never faced any problems, but, man, tax cuts mean more for everybody. It means inflation-free growth and inflation-free high employment. But that helps the individual and not the collective.

[froot loops]

I have had a job since I have been 15 you fucking dumbass.

[Jeff Buchanan]

An intriguing argument advanced by a guest essayist that appeared in the Economist that Putin's invasion of Ukraine was a result of timidity on the part of the western alliances to admit Ukraine to NATO. In the process of presenting a credible argument for Ukraine's admission to NATO as early as 2008, the author blows apart the nonsense that Putin has advanced about Ukraine never being a state, and rightfully a part of mother Russia. He can assert that non-sense. The reality is that NATO could have shut him down before the death and destruction that ass-hole has created.

The problem is not that NATO enlargement went too far. The problem is that it didn’t go far enough. If Ukraine had been a member of NATO—if American and NATO troops had been deployed to its territory to defend the country—Mr Putin would have thought twice before starting a war with a nuclear-armed alliance militarily superior to his own army. That is the potency of deterrence. With American and NATO troops on the ground, the onus of starting a war with NATO would have been on Russia. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the onus to intervene and go to war is on NATO—not Russia.

Therein lies the real lesson for the future. Whenever this war ends, NATO will have to decide whether to invite Ukraine to join the alliance and thereby deter a renewal of Russian aggression. Given the damage and destruction that Russia has already caused, that should be an easy decision for NATO to make.

Fuck Putin.

[Jeff Buchanan]

The link below may or may not be pay-walled. Its an interactive model demonstrating how tactically stupid the Russian army's plan to seize Kiev was as the first few days of the invasion progressed. The analysis makes the Russian state media's attempts to dismiss how bad of an ass-kicking their forces took trying to seize Kiev ludicrous. Of course, Russian citizens inside that country aren't getting any balance to the absurd claims Putin is ramming down their throats at gun-point. Utterly shameful.

The model also demonstrates the unparalleled strategic incompetence of Putin's generals that planned the assault on Kiev. Full of bluster, you can just see these buffoons sucking Putin's cock when, pre-invasion, they presented their plan that included a parade in dress uniforms down the main thoroughfare of central Kiev by the conquering army.

There's no question at all that Ukrainian forces that confronted Russian attempts to at first enter the city and later, after that failed, to encircle Kiev, cut it off and force its surrender, which also failed, had a good tactical plan to do that but also had downsides. Russian armor accompanied by APCs tried to enter the city by easily identifiable attack corridors once the offensive was underway. These corridors to the NE are open roadways, easy to defend. From the NW corridors of attack are blocked naturally by the Dnipro river that bisects the city. Futile attempts, after the Ukrainians blew-up three key bridges, were made by Russian engineering companies to bridge the Dnipro. Another massive failure induced by small, highly successful unit attacks conducted by the Ukrainians on the poorly supported and defended engineering companies.

What were the downsides? Ukrainian forces hid out in residential buildings and fired anti-tank weapons from above the tank columns - an direction of attack where armor is most vulnerable and the blast potential of the anti-tank weapons are optimized. That resulted in bombardment of those same residential buildings based on counter-battery intelligence derived by the Russians.

For now, the Russians are conducting tactical withdrawals from previously held territory in and around Kiev and it's suburbs. They have also withdrawn from Hostomel - the airfield to the NE of Kiev's city center that Russian planners attempted to seize on day one and failed in spectacular fashion to do so. You'll recall a giant Anatov transport, likely full of supplies and Russian paratroopers was shot down that day. As well, plenty of video emerged on day one of supporting Russian attack helicopters and MIGs being blown up by SAMs - unreported losses of those helicopters and fixed wing assets were probably huge.

Russian state media announcements claim that Russia will now focus on the two SE regions, Donbas and Lunhansk, where the Russian army has gained considerable territorial control. Recall that since 2014, these two areas were home to Russian separatist forces that, in some areas, occupied and administered them. Pre-war estimates indicated about 1/3 of the two Oblasts and the cities within them were under Russian control. Ukrainians living there were generally opposed to Russian political administration and policing that is a normal (and suppressive) function of that. Embedded Ukrainian local and regular armed forces were constantly challenging control by Russia's proxy forces - the separatists - across both Oblasts.

As Russia redirects combat power to these regions they will try to extend it's control and use that as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. While control of Ukraine's entire Sea of Azov and Black Sea coastline and ports (Mariupol is one, Odessa another) might be the Kremlin's objective, there's no assurance that their army can achieve that objective facing a continued Ukrainian local and regular army resistance. Plenty of questions remain of how effective damaged Russian forces being re-directed there can be. Anyone's guess at this point The slug-fest, now centered in the SE and closer to Russian supply lines inside Russia will continue. Note that yesterday's attack on a fuel and ammunition depot in Belgorod is, IMO, a clear signal from Ukraine that we can reach your supply lines inside Russia if you persist in battling us for control of Donbas and Luhansk. Fair warning delivered.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/02/world/europe/kyiv-invasion-disaster.html

[froot loops]

I didn't get to read the essay in the Economist that Jeff references, but I think that saying NATO was too timid in 2008 has the benefit of hindsight. The West as a whole was fairly bullish on Putin for a long time. That sentiment had started to cool considerably by 2008 but not entirely.

Here's a pretty long article detailing the last 20 years with Ukraine, Putin and the west. A consistent theme in the article is how every time a leader goes to talk to Putin he gets crazier.

[Jeff Buchanan]

Some good photos ...... not of suffering Ukrainian's so much as victory over invading Russians.

https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-europe-92d9344c3ac7ec8db9eee89212441b75

[Jeff Buchanan]

The WSJ article is paywalled. Subscribes only. Can you give a summary of key points. I think the thrust of the Economist article and the WSJ article would be similar in that, in retrospect, the threat of Russian aggression to the West and through Ukraine was pretty obvious maybe as early as 5 years before the current invasion.

My take is that NATO and the EU were lulled into complacency by the foolish wish that you could bring Russia into the circle of global trading partners to insure peace in Europe. Germany was the primary driver of that approach. I really don't care much about looking at history. What I care about is how Russia under Putin's presidency is dealt with going forward.

I can see Zelenski's political strategy of seeking admission to the EU and obtaining security guarantees at some level, short of NATO admission. The idea he forwarded last week of state guarantors that would include the US, Turkey, Russia and others is likely a non-starter. In order to facilitate a better approach, Zelenski's Ukraine has to defeat or reach a stalemate with Putin's Russia by neutralizing the combat power of Russian forces occupying parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. I think you are already seeing this strategy emerge on the part of Ukraine.

A better approach might be to initiate a referendum among NATO members that creates a corollary within the NATO charter stating that while Ukraine is not a member of the NATO alliance, the strategic interests of NATO are advanced by a free and independent Ukraine. Any aggression against Ukraine by any state or from regions inside Ukraine by separatists or any foreign occupying forces will result in a like kind response from NATO members.

Two things happen: (1) Ukraine becomes a buffer zone to the exposed eastern flank of NATO. (2) Russia, having been, for all intent and purpose, defeated In Ukraine, withdraws it's forces to the pre-2014 boarder with Ukraine. Referendums are undertaken in disputed territory (including Crimea) to determine who will administer previously Russian occupied territories.

[froot loops]

That link was not paywalled for me, I think if you try it incognito mode it gets around it sometimes.

[lineygoblue]

My take is that NATO and the EU were lulled into complacency by the foolish wish that you could bring Russia into the circle of global trading partners to insure peace in Europe. Germany was the primary driver of that approach. I really don't care much about looking at history. What I care about is how Russia under Putin's presidency is dealt with going forward.

To me this poses the question, is the problem Putin, or is the problem Russia? I have a gut feeling that most Russian citizens don't give a rat's patoot about Ukraine, and would just prefer to live and let live. I also get the impression that the average Russian citizen wants the same things we want. They want to live in peace, have some money in their pocket, food on their tables, have a decent place to live and work, and have personal liberty to live their lives as they choose. Putin seems to be the stick-in-the-mud. Maybe without him, Russia could be the trading partner that Europe has wanted?

[froot loops]

Putin is the immediate problem now, but you would be fooling yourself if you think that deposing him now would provide much of a cure. The country has more or less been run by autocrats forever.

[Jeff Buchanan]

The source of his power are the oligarchs, military generals and government officials he has enriched and are now indebted to serve him. He's entrenched in a system he's erected over his 22y of consolidating his power. He ain't going anywhere. He can be isolated to a certain extent though.

[Da Geezer]

And let's remember some reasons why Ukraine was not admitted to NATO. Foremost among them was that Ukraine was a corrupt kleptocracy. The Panama Papers showed that Zolinsky has millions in offshore accounts, as does his predecessor. Plus, there was the matter of not tweaking the Russian Bear.

I think Jeff is right in saying that most everyone wanted Russia to be a West-facing European state with trading ties to the West. Since these decisions were made, China has become a major player in world affairs, but it wasn't so much when the NATO decision(s) were taken.

[froot loops]

It's a little more complicated, those oligarchs were enriched before he came to power. How those guys became oligarchs was corrupt as shit and gave him the alleged reform olatform. He was a guy the oligarchs felt they could control. The West thought he would be an improvement on Yeltsin. Once he got into power, he made examples of a few oligarchs and clipped the wings of the rest of them. It's standard dictator's life cycle in a petro state. Jail opponents, crush dissent, shut down any media that criticizes the state.

When there's no deep state and.meeedia to keep a dictator in check, it's hard to undo.