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This just popped up. In some ways, it's a counter argument to what I just posted. The difference is that the authors in the Economist article think giving the Ukrainians Polish and Bulgarian aircraft is fine. IMO, that will produce the same result that the Economist's authors are trying to avoid by arguing against a declaration of a no-fly-zone. It's pay-walled. It's important though. Fuck it.
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has called for one. His enemy, Vladimir Putin, has condemned the idea. A no-fly zone is becoming a measure of how fervently you support Mr Zelensky and his brave compatriots. Who could be against protecting Ukrainian civilians from Russian bombing that counts as a war crime? Besides, a no-fly zone would let Ukrainian troops strike at Russian convoys without the threat of an aerial attack. It is an alluring proposal. It is also wrong-headed.
Calls for NATO to impose a no-fly zone are growing louder because, in the second week of war, Russia has switched tactics. After the failure of its initial lightning assault, through a combination of Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness and Russian incompetence, Mr Putin is resorting to the murderous use of brute force. Russian armour has made most ground in the south, having burst out from Crimea and from Donbas in the east. Progress in the north is slow, but the aim is clearly for troops coming from Belarus and the east to encircle the capital Kyiv, besiege it and, if necessary, pummel it into submission.
The worse the war goes for Mr Putin, the more he will resort to terrorising Ukrainian civilians—and seek to present their leaders with the agonising choice between surrender or mass slaughter. People are already suffering grievously in cities like Kharkiv and Chernihiv, where they are being bombarded indiscriminately, including with cluster bombs, which inflict heavy casualties by spreading explosives over a wide area. Aerial attacks have been reported in Zhytomyr, Bucha and Irpin and other towns surrounding Kyiv. A ceasefire in Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov, to give residents safe passage, broke down when Russian forces resumed their barrage after just 45 minutes.
The proponents of a no-fly zone, including Ukraine’s government, argue that preventing Russia from using its aircraft or drones would protect civilians against these merciless tactics. Some NATO members enforced a no-fly zone over parts of Iraq in the 1990s and later that decade over Bosnia and in 2011 over Libya during the overthrow of its dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. NATO should impose one today, too, they say.
They think that a no-fly zone would not only fulfil a humanitarian imperative, but it would also make sense for NATO. Tactically, they say, it would deprive Mr Putin of an important weapon, buy Ukrainian forces time to resupply and give them more freedom to attack Russian columns. A no-fly zone would be strategically valuable, too, they argue. Mr Putin has made clear that one of his aims is to wreck NATO, by pushing the United States out of Europe. That is much less likely if the invasion of Ukraine fails.
The support for these arguments is likely to grow with the killing in Ukrainian cities. And every right-thinking person should be in favour of seeing Mr Zelensky and his people defeat Mr Putin’s armies. However, the closer you look, the more it is apparent that a no-fly zone would not only fail to bring this about, but also court catastrophe.
For one thing, it would do little or nothing to further its main aim, of protecting Ukrainian civilians. Russia is relying chiefly on artillery and missiles to attack Ukrainian cities. To the extent that it is using air power, its commanders would simply shift more of their effort to ground-based weapons. Having accepted that the killing of civilians is morally unacceptable, would NATO be able to stand back as the slaughter continued?
In the past no-fly zones have not been tightly enforced, because patrolling large parts of the skies is costly and difficult. To do so would also lead to direct conflict between Russia and America. NATO aircraft—which here means the US Air Force—would first need to destroy Russian air-defence systems. If, as is likely, Russian aircraft continued to fly regardless, then NATO would have to start shooting them out of the sky.
Mr Putin seems to believe that he is already at war with NATO. If he will not stop at Ukraine, he must be defeated militarily. Why not get it over with now, while he is struggling?
The answer is that there is a world of difference between diplomatic and logistical support for Ukraine and outright combat with Russia. Mr Putin has already shown that, faced with a setback on the battlefield, his instinct is to escalate. If NATO starts shooting down Russia’s air force, it is inviting him to raise the stakes by, for instance, shelling the alliance’s frontline states. NATO could find itself in the position where it, too, has to escalate in response, so as to preserve the credibility of the pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all, the cornerstone of the alliance.
Be under no illusions, such an escalation could lead to nuclear war, especially if—as is likely—Mr Putin felt the need to compensate for Russia’s defeat in a conventional exchange. Russia’s president has already threatened to use nuclear weapons. There has also been speculation that he could be preparing a chemical attack. The logic of escalation requires each side to meet an assault by retaliating. It can easily become a test of which side is most willing to go to the greatest extreme.
By upholding the distinction between fighting Russia and supporting Ukraine, NATO limits the risk of such an escalation, even if it does not remove it entirely. That is because NATO is signalling that there are limits to its involvement, and because Russia cannot so easily slide from action inside Ukraine to action inside NATO.
By contrast, a no-fly zone makes war in NATO’s frontline states a continuation of the war in Ukraine. It courts catastrophe without even holding out the promise of bringing material help to Mr Zelensky and his forces.
NATO is already supplying Ukraine with lethal weapons and imposing harsh sanctions on Russia. It can and should do more. One idea is for Poland to give Ukraine some of its old Soviet-made fighter aircraft. It could also bolster Ukrainian air-defences with longer-range systems than the portable Stinger missiles they have received so far. Both would help more than asking NATO pilots to do the job for them.
Another good idea would be to degrade Russia’s economy further by imposing embargoes on buying Russian oil and gas. The current sanctions avoid energy, but Russia desperately needs hard currency from oil and gas exports to pay for its imports, because existing sanctions have frozen its reserves.
Both arms supplies and an embargo also risk escalation. And sanctions on Russian energy would come at a high price to the world economy. But they entail less risk and a lower price than a no-fly zone would. What is more, they might actually work.
Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has called for one. His enemy, Vladimir Putin, has condemned the idea. A no-fly zone is becoming a measure of how fervently you support Mr Zelensky and his brave compatriots. Who could be against protecting Ukrainian civilians from Russian bombing that counts as a war crime? Besides, a no-fly zone would let Ukrainian troops strike at Russian convoys without the threat of an aerial attack. It is an alluring proposal. It is also wrong-headed.
Calls for NATO to impose a no-fly zone are growing louder because, in the second week of war, Russia has switched tactics. After the failure of its initial lightning assault, through a combination of Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness and Russian incompetence, Mr Putin is resorting to the murderous use of brute force. Russian armour has made most ground in the south, having burst out from Crimea and from Donbas in the east. Progress in the north is slow, but the aim is clearly for troops coming from Belarus and the east to encircle the capital Kyiv, besiege it and, if necessary, pummel it into submission.
The worse the war goes for Mr Putin, the more he will resort to terrorising Ukrainian civilians—and seek to present their leaders with the agonising choice between surrender or mass slaughter. People are already suffering grievously in cities like Kharkiv and Chernihiv, where they are being bombarded indiscriminately, including with cluster bombs, which inflict heavy casualties by spreading explosives over a wide area. Aerial attacks have been reported in Zhytomyr, Bucha and Irpin and other towns surrounding Kyiv. A ceasefire in Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov, to give residents safe passage, broke down when Russian forces resumed their barrage after just 45 minutes.
The proponents of a no-fly zone, including Ukraine’s government, argue that preventing Russia from using its aircraft or drones would protect civilians against these merciless tactics. Some NATO members enforced a no-fly zone over parts of Iraq in the 1990s and later that decade over Bosnia and in 2011 over Libya during the overthrow of its dictator, Muammar Qaddafi. NATO should impose one today, too, they say.
They think that a no-fly zone would not only fulfil a humanitarian imperative, but it would also make sense for NATO. Tactically, they say, it would deprive Mr Putin of an important weapon, buy Ukrainian forces time to resupply and give them more freedom to attack Russian columns. A no-fly zone would be strategically valuable, too, they argue. Mr Putin has made clear that one of his aims is to wreck NATO, by pushing the United States out of Europe. That is much less likely if the invasion of Ukraine fails.
The support for these arguments is likely to grow with the killing in Ukrainian cities. And every right-thinking person should be in favour of seeing Mr Zelensky and his people defeat Mr Putin’s armies. However, the closer you look, the more it is apparent that a no-fly zone would not only fail to bring this about, but also court catastrophe.
For one thing, it would do little or nothing to further its main aim, of protecting Ukrainian civilians. Russia is relying chiefly on artillery and missiles to attack Ukrainian cities. To the extent that it is using air power, its commanders would simply shift more of their effort to ground-based weapons. Having accepted that the killing of civilians is morally unacceptable, would NATO be able to stand back as the slaughter continued?
In the past no-fly zones have not been tightly enforced, because patrolling large parts of the skies is costly and difficult. To do so would also lead to direct conflict between Russia and America. NATO aircraft—which here means the US Air Force—would first need to destroy Russian air-defence systems. If, as is likely, Russian aircraft continued to fly regardless, then NATO would have to start shooting them out of the sky.
Mr Putin seems to believe that he is already at war with NATO. If he will not stop at Ukraine, he must be defeated militarily. Why not get it over with now, while he is struggling?
The answer is that there is a world of difference between diplomatic and logistical support for Ukraine and outright combat with Russia. Mr Putin has already shown that, faced with a setback on the battlefield, his instinct is to escalate. If NATO starts shooting down Russia’s air force, it is inviting him to raise the stakes by, for instance, shelling the alliance’s frontline states. NATO could find itself in the position where it, too, has to escalate in response, so as to preserve the credibility of the pledge that an attack on one member is an attack on all, the cornerstone of the alliance.
Be under no illusions, such an escalation could lead to nuclear war, especially if—as is likely—Mr Putin felt the need to compensate for Russia’s defeat in a conventional exchange. Russia’s president has already threatened to use nuclear weapons. There has also been speculation that he could be preparing a chemical attack. The logic of escalation requires each side to meet an assault by retaliating. It can easily become a test of which side is most willing to go to the greatest extreme.
By upholding the distinction between fighting Russia and supporting Ukraine, NATO limits the risk of such an escalation, even if it does not remove it entirely. That is because NATO is signalling that there are limits to its involvement, and because Russia cannot so easily slide from action inside Ukraine to action inside NATO.
By contrast, a no-fly zone makes war in NATO’s frontline states a continuation of the war in Ukraine. It courts catastrophe without even holding out the promise of bringing material help to Mr Zelensky and his forces.
NATO is already supplying Ukraine with lethal weapons and imposing harsh sanctions on Russia. It can and should do more. One idea is for Poland to give Ukraine some of its old Soviet-made fighter aircraft. It could also bolster Ukrainian air-defences with longer-range systems than the portable Stinger missiles they have received so far. Both would help more than asking NATO pilots to do the job for them.
Another good idea would be to degrade Russia’s economy further by imposing embargoes on buying Russian oil and gas. The current sanctions avoid energy, but Russia desperately needs hard currency from oil and gas exports to pay for its imports, because existing sanctions have frozen its reserves.
Both arms supplies and an embargo also risk escalation. And sanctions on Russian energy would come at a high price to the world economy. But they entail less risk and a lower price than a no-fly zone would. What is more, they might actually work.
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