Miscellaneous And Off Topic Subjects

[iam416]

The crazy Covid bill is definitely a cause of inflation.

Infrastructure is too far off — well, assuming the inflation is “transitory”

It’s hard to say with the reconciliation because the Ds made so much of their shit “temporary” with every intention of making it permanent so as to avoid an even worse CBO score.

BTW, I can play back The Chairman on inflation if you want. That’s the thing, man, if you wanna play the quote game I have a goddamn treasure trove to choose from.

[Dr. Strangelove]

The crazy Covid bill is definitely a cause of inflation.

Infrastructure is too far off — well, assuming the inflation is “transitory”

It’s hard to say with the reconciliation because the Ds made so much of their shit “temporary” with every intention of making it permanent so as to avoid an even worse CBO score.

BTW, I can play back The Chairman on inflation if you want. That’s the thing, man, if you wanna play the quote game I have a goddamn treasure trove to choose from.

Well sure, everyone has awful quotes. You don't need to play back the Chairman I know lots of people played down inflation including myself for a while. What is reality? Reality is that BIF + BBB are almost certainly NOT going to create anywhere near the inflationary pressure of the 3 covid bills (two eagerly signed by TRUMP). That doesn't mean I think the BBB is 100% good policy, just that the role in inflation is being exaggerated to gain political support to defeat it.

There's awful stuff In the BBB. I said weeks ago that the SALT cap repeal is fucking atrocious and benefits only the richest people in the richest states. It's the single most expensive item in the bill. But for once it's certain that you can't pin that on Progs. It's 100% the demand of the most right-leaning folks still left in the Democratic Party.

[Dr. Strangelove]

I don't really remember who was the leader of the Republicans in the House before Newt Gingrich because that's pretty much before my political awareness.

But boy, Kevin McCarthy will probably be the Speaker in 2023 and he's the least impressive, most craven leader of either party that I can remember. Being the leader of the Republican caucus has utterly sucked since 2008 because 1/3 of the members have no interest in policy, legislation, or anything serious, they are just in DC to create social media content and become FoxNews "stars".

[Dr. Strangelove]

He's a nihilist, Donnie. A fucking nihilist. Say what you want about the tenets of National Socialism but...

[Mike]

I like the man in Kenosha who was trying to put out a fire and had his jaw broken. I guess he got what deserved for trying to do the job of the fire department.

Everyone takes a beating sometime.

[Kapture1]

Probably opening myself up to fire here but LET 'ER RIP!!!

letting people keep more of their own money doesn't "cost" anything.

[Kapture1]

What he did may have been legal. That certainly doesn't make it right.

there is no moral verdict here, there is only what's legal and what isn't.

[Mike]

Exactly. That’s why we have trials.

[Cody_Russell]

If we’re being “honest” here, no House speaker quite spoke to the American people like Boehner. I mean, look at that fantastic house and lawn. This is the type of stuff we need from our politicians.
Boehner, most definitely the Butch Jones and/or DJ Durkin of American politics.

[iam416]

If you want to read the whole article, the link is here: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24...united-states/ (it's an argument that declining superpowers are more likely to cause wars than rising ones). Anyway, the interesting take is the assertion that China is in decline (and, hence, more likely to be aggressive):

China today—the trap in which an aspiring superpower peaks and then refuses to bear the painful consequences of descent.

China’s rise is no mirage: Decades of growth have given Beijing the economic sinews of global power. Major investments in key technologies and communications infrastructure have yielded a strong position in the struggle for geoeconomic influence; China is using a multi-continent Belt and Road Initiative to bring other states into its orbit. Most alarming, think tank assessments and U.S. Defense Department reports show China’s increasingly formidable military now stands a real chance of winning a war against the United States in the Western Pacific.

It is unsurprising, therefore, that China has also developed the ambitions of a superpower: Xi has more or less announced that Beijing desires to assert its sovereignty over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and other disputed areas, becoming Asia’s preeminent power and challenging the United States for global leadership. Yet if China’s geopolitical window of opportunity is real, its future is already starting to look quite grim because it is quickly losing the advantages that propelled its rapid growth.

From the 1970s to the 2000s, China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and energy resources. It enjoyed the greatest demographic dividend in history, with 10 working-age adults for every senior citizen aged 65 or older. (For most major economies, the average is closer to 5 working-age adults for every senior citizen.) China had a secure geopolitical environment and easy access to foreign markets and technology, all underpinned by friendly relations with the United States. And China’s government skillfully harnessed these advantages by carrying out a process of economic reform and opening while also moving the regime from stifling totalitarianism under former Chinese leader Mao Zedong to a smarter—if still deeply repressive—form of authoritarianism under his successors. China had it all from the 1970s to the early 2010s—just the mix of endowments, environment, people, and policies needed to thrive.

Since the late 2000s, however, the drivers of China’s rise have either stalled or turned around entirely. For example, China is running out of resources: Water has become scarce, and the country is importing more energy and food than any other nation, having ravaged its own natural resources. Economic growth is therefore becoming costlier: According to data from DBS Bank, it takes three times as many inputs to produce a unit of growth today as it did in the early 2000s.

China is also approaching a demographic precipice: From 2020 to 2050, it will lose an astounding 200 million working-age adults—a population the size of Nigeria—and gain 200 million senior citizens. The fiscal and economic consequences will be devastating: Current projections suggest China’s medical and social security spending will have to triple as a share of GDP, from 10 percent to 30 percent, by 2050 just to prevent millions of seniors from dying of impoverishment and neglect.

To make matters worse, China is turning away from the package of policies that promoted rapid growth. Under Xi, Beijing has slid back toward totalitarianism. Xi has appointed himself “chairman of everything,” destroyed any semblance of collective rule, and made adherence to “Xi Jinping thought” the ideological core of an increasingly rigid regime. And he has relentlessly pursued the centralization of power at the expense of economic prosperity.

State zombie firms are being propped up while private firms are starved of capital. Objective economic analysis is being replaced by government propaganda. Innovation is becoming more difficult in a climate of stultifying ideological conformity. Meanwhile, Xi’s brutal anti-corruption campaign has deterred entrepreneurship, and a wave of politically driven regulations has erased more than $1 trillion from the market capitalization of China’s leading tech firms. Xi hasn’t simply stopped the process of economic liberalization that powered China’s development: He has thrown it hard into reverse.

The economic damage these trends are causing is starting to accumulate—and it is compounding the slowdown that would have occurred anyway as a fast-growing economy matures. The Chinese economy has been losing steam for more than a decade: The country’s official growth rate declined from 14 percent in 2007 to 6 percent in 2019, and rigorous studies suggest the true growth rate is now closer to 2 percent. Worse, most of that growth stems from government stimulus spending. According to data from the Conference Board, total factor productivity declined 1.3 percent every year on average between 2008 and 2019, meaning China is spending more to produce less each year. This has led, in turn, to massive debt: China’s total debt surged eight-fold between 2008 and 2019 and exceeded 300 percent of GDP prior to COVID-19. Any country that has accumulated debt or lost productivity at anything close to China’s current pace has subsequently suffered at least one “lost decade” of near-zero economic growth.

All of this is happening, moreover, as China confronts an increasingly hostile external environment. The combination of COVID-19, persistent human rights abuses, and aggressive policies have caused negative views of China to reach levels not seen since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Countries worried about Chinese competition have slapped thousands of new trade barriers on its goods since 2008. More than a dozen countries have dropped out of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative while the United States wages a global campaign against key Chinese tech companies—notably, Huawei—and rich democracies across multiple continents throw up barriers to Beijing’s digital influence. The world is becoming less conducive to easy Chinese growth, and Xi’s regime increasingly faces the sort of strategic encirclement that once drove German and Japanese leaders to desperation.

Case in point is U.S. policy. Over the past five years, two U.S. presidential administrations have committed the United States to a policy of “competition”—really, neo-containment—vis-à-vis China. U.S. defense strategy is now focused squarely on defeating Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific; Washington is using an array of trade and technological sanctions to check Beijing’s influence and limit its prospects for economic primacy. “Once imperial America considers you as their ‘enemy,’ you’re in big trouble,” one senior People’s Liberation Army officer warned. Indeed, the United States has also committed to orchestrating greater global resistance to Chinese power, a campaign that is starting to show results as more and more countries respond to the threat from Beijing.

In maritime Asia, resistance to Chinese power is stiffening. Taiwan is boosting military spending and laying plans to turn itself into a strategic porcupine in the Western Pacific. Japan is carrying out its biggest military buildup since the end of the Cold War and has agreed to back the United States if China attacks Taiwan. The countries around the South China Sea, particularly Vietnam and Indonesia, are beefing up their air, naval, and coast guard forces to contest China’s expansive claims.

Other countries are pushing back against Beijing’s assertiveness as well. Australia is expanding northern bases to accommodate U.S. ships and aircraft and building long-range conventional missiles and nuclear-powered attack submarines. India is massing forces on its border with China while sending warships through the South China Sea. The European Union has labeled Beijing a “systemic rival,” and Europe’s three greatest powers—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—have dispatched naval task forces to the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. A variety of multilateral anti-China initiatives—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; supply chain alliances; the new so-called AUKUS alliance with Washington, London, and Canberra; and others—are in the works. The United States’ “multilateral club strategy,” hawkish and well-connected scholar Yan Xuetong acknowledged in July, is “isolating China” and hurting its development.

No doubt, counter-China cooperation has remained imperfect. But the overall trend is clear: An array of actors is gradually joining forces to check Beijing’s power and put it in a strategic box. China, in other words, is not a forever-ascendant country. It is an already-strong, enormously ambitious, and deeply troubled power whose window of opportunity won’t stay open for long.

[CGVT]

On to a topic of much greater importance, what do you think of Russell's Reserve 10? I picked up a bottle yesterday on a whim and haven't tried it yet. Got it home and checked the reviews on line and they are a mixed bag. It appears they may have had a bad batch that soured a lot of people to it. I'm going to crack it open tonight and give it a try.

Any insight?

[Tom W]

If we’re being “honest” here, no House speaker quite spoke to the American people like Boehner. I mean, look at that fantastic house and lawn. This is the type of stuff we need from our politicians.
Boehner, most definitely the Butch Jones and/or DJ Durkin of American politics.

Well, at least he's got the same Toro lawnmower as I do.

[AlabamAlum]

On to a topic of much greater importance, what do you think of Russell's Reserve 10? I picked up a bottle yesterday on a whim and haven't tried it yet. Got it home and checked the reviews on line and they are a mixed bag. It appears they may have had a bad batch that soured a lot of people to it. I'm going to crack it open tonight and give it a try.

Any insight?

RR10 is a fine daily drinker. A bottle under $40 doesn’t need to be compared to a $70-$100 bottle, but that’s what people do and it’s silly. I usually go for Larceny or Michters at this price point, but RR10 is solid.

[CGVT]

RR10 is a fine daily drinker. A bottle under $40 doesn’t need to be compared to a $70-$100 bottle, but that’s what people do and it’s silly. I usually go for Larceny or Michters at this price point, but RR10 is solid.

Thanks for the input. I have been a beer drinker my whole life, but have had to give it up as I can't keep my weight under control when I drink the beers that I like, so I have been broadening my liquor horizons lately. My foray into Bourbon is rather new and I am looking to find a daily drinker that doesn't break the bank.

[AlabamAlum]

CGVT,

You probably want to start slow and mellow and then branch out with the higher octane cask strength and more oak-rich piquant varieties. I would stay between 80-90 proof until you acclimate on the jump in ABV from beer to spirits.

Regular Woodford, Old Forester, and Four Roses are all good places to start for a smooth starter bourbon. The latter two are cheap. Woodford is a bit more. I’m not a huge regular Maker’s guy, but Maker’s 46 is worth the few extra dollars, IMO and is mellow.

For a few more dollars, Blanton’s (if you can find it) and Basil Hayden fit that same bill.